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Abstract 
We study investor activism promoting environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
improvements using a proprietary dataset covering 660 companies globally over 2005-
2014. Targets have a higher market share, analyst coverage, stock returns, and liquidity. 
The engagements lead to significant ESG rating adjustments. Activism is more likely to 
succeed for companies with a good ex ante ESG track record, and with lower ownership 
concentration and growth. Successful engagements positively affect sales growth, without 
changing profitability. Targets outperform matched firms by 2.7% over 6 months post-
engagement, while the (ex ante) lowest ESG quartile earns an extra 7.5% over 1 year. 
Keywords: investor activism; corporate social responsibility; socially responsible investing 
(SRI); engagement; environmental, social and governance (ESG).  
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Increasingly prominent, activist investors such as hedge funds, pension funds, and 
influential individual shareholders and families set out to reshape corporate policies and 
strategy (e.g., Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2009; Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner, 
2017). In this paper, we focus on activism from a different perspective: given that socially 
responsible investments (SRI) have become increasingly important, we examine whether 
investor activism is able to promote corporate social responsibility (CSR) as reflected in 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices, and whether such activism affects 
ESG practices, corporate performance and investment results.  
In the past two decades, socially responsible investing has grown from a niche 
segment to become mainstream. The UN Principles for Responsible Investing (2015), 
which establishes principles of responsible investing and guidelines for companies, reports 
that a large number of institutions (managing about $59 trillion) has endorsed these 
investing principles, thereby declaring that corporate social responsibility is an essential 
part of their due diligence process and matters for investment decisions. Further, the 
Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (2015) estimates that over $21 trillion of 
professionally managed assets are explicitly allocated in accordance with ESG standards, 
driven by pension funds but increasingly also by mutual funds, hedge funds, venture 
capital and real estate funds. A subset of these investors actively engages with the 
companies in their portfolios, requesting that companies improve their environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) practices (see, e.g., Dimson, Karakaş and Li, 2015; Doidge, 
Dyck, Mahmudi and Virani, 2015).1  
                                         




In our paper, we study investor activism on corporate social responsibility using a 
large, detailed, and proprietary dataset on CSR activist engagements by a leading 
European investment management firm that is managing SRI funds both for its own 
account and for its clients. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
investigate such ESG engagements in an international context. In particular, this paper 
addresses the following questions: (i) how does the activist investor choose target 
companies aiming at improving their ESG practices?; (ii) how are such engagements 
carried out?; (iii) are such engagements successful in improving the targets’ ESG 
performance?; (iv) what drives success or failure in ESG activism?; and (v) is the activism 
visible in the targets’ operations (e.g., accounting returns, profit margin, sales growth, 
etc.) and (vi) in terms of investment value creation (i.e., stock returns).  
Our panel spans a decade (2005-2014), 660 engaged companies from around the 
globe, and 847 separate engagements. The engagements in our sample primarily concern 
social matters (43.3%) and environmental issues (42.3%), while only relatively few concern 
governance issues (14.4%). As a result, these CSR engagements are quite different from 
the activities by other activist investors such as hedge funds, that generally focus on 
financial value through advocating for asset restructuring and governance improvement 
(e.g. Becht et al., 2017), but do not consider social and environmental practices as 
independent objectives.  
We find that engaged companies typically have a higher market share and are 
followed by more analysts than their peers. Accordingly, in order to avoid selection bias 
and to account for unobserved heterogeneity, in subsequent analyses we match the 
engaged firms to control firms from the same industry that are similar ex-ante in terms 
of size, market-to-book ratio, ESG rating, and ROA. In the case of environmental and 
social activism, the most common channel for engagement is either a letter or email 
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addressed to the top management or the board of directors. In cases that relate to 
governance, the activist typically participates in shareholder meetings or meets in person 
with firm representatives (managers or non-executive directors). 
In our sample, firms with lower ex-ante ESG ratings are more likely to be engaged 
by the activist. Our evidence suggests that these engagements reveal information about 
the ESG practices at the engaged companies, which information is subsequently reflected 
in commercially-available, independent ESG ratings. On the one hand, targets with ex-
ante low ESG ratings see their ratings improve during the activism period. On the other 
hand, for targets with high ex-ante ESG ratings, the engagement process seems to induce 
a negative correction during the activism period, suggesting that some of the concerns of 
the activist investor were not previously incorporated in these ratings and are publicly 
disclosed due to the activism.  
The activist considers the engagement as successful depending on whether or not 
the target sufficiently adjusts its policy on one of more ex-ante determined ESG 
dimensions. Most of the engagement files in our sample (59%) are considered successfully 
closed by the activist, which is more likely for targets with a larger market share, a good 
ESG track record, and earlier successful engagements. The presence of a large controlling 
shareholder, high short-term growth and a larger cash reserve are associated with a lower 
likelihood of success. The activist’s request for a material change from the engaged 
company (which we call a reorganization) reduces the likelihood of a successful outcome, 
relative to an engagement that, e.g., stimulates the target to be more transparent in its 
ESG policies. 
Examining the changes in operating performance following engagement, we find no 
relation with accounting performance or any of its components. However, sales growth 
increases on average substantially following a successful engagement, which could indicate 
4 
 
that the implemented changes appeal to a broader customer clientele. Finally, we find 
positive buy-and-hold stock returns in the month of the completion of the engagement 
and over subsequent time windows of 6 and 12 months. After the completion of an 
engagement, excess stock returns (with four-factor adjustment and relative to a matched 
sample) are higher after successful outcomes, where the difference between successful and 
unsuccessful engagements is mainly significant within a period of 6 to 12 months, and 
disappears subsequently. For example, the excess returns of targeted firms are higher than 
those of non-targeted peer firms by 2.7% over the 6-month period following the 
engagement. Results are especially strong for firms with low ex-ante ESG scores. 
Specifically, targeted firms in the lowest ex-ante ESG quartile outperform their matched 
peers by 7.5% in the year after the end of the engagement. Our results thus suggest that 
the activism regarding corporate social responsibility generally improves ESG practices 
and corporate sales and is profitable to the activist. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the 
literature on (CSR) activism and CSR performance. We describe the data sample in 
Section 3 and detail the process of CSR engagement in Section 4. We then study the firm 
characteristics of engaged firms (in Section 5), successful engagements (in Section 6), and 
the financial and operating performance following CSR activism (in Sections 7). We 
conclude and discuss extensions in Section 8. 
 
2. Literature review 
This paper links up with several related but confined strands of the literature: 
shareholder activism in general, SRI fund management and the impact of ESG screening 
devices, and the impact of unobservable activism (i.e., taking place behind the scenes). 
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Shareholder activism in general can be loosely partitioned into three categories (Dimson 
et al., 2015): traditional activism, hedge fund activism, and corporate social responsibility 
activism. Traditional activism is typically exercised by mutual funds or pension funds and 
generally concerns topics related to corporate governance or restructuring. Hedge fund 
activists seek to create financial value by influencing corporate strategy and structure. 
Activism on CSR aims to improve corporate citizenship, mainly focusing on issues related 
to environmental and social topics. 
Social responsibility and ethical investments have religious roots (e.g., in the 17th 
century Quaker movement; Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2008a). Still, it was not 
until the 1960’s that socially responsible investing (SRI) gained momentum and the 
general public’s interest. Growing concerns about human rights, pacifism, and 
environmental issues paved the way of today’s SRI. The first modern investment vehicle 
catering to socially responsible investors was Pax World Fund, a mutual fund founded in 
1971. Since then, SRI has been expanding from a niche market strategy to a mainstream 
investment style. According to SRI reports, total assets under management (AUM) 
surpassed the $21 trillion mark globally (Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, 2015), 
with $6.20 trillion in the United States (US SIF, 2014) and $6.72 trillion in Europe 
(Eurosif, 2014). 
Fund managers apply various techniques and screens to form socially responsible 
portfolios. Bollen (2007), and Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang (2008b, 2011) differentiate 
among distinct types of SRI screens. First, negative screening is the most basic type that 
avoids investing in firms that sell products such as alcohol, tobacco, weaponry, abortion-
related drugs, and pornography. Second, positive screens select companies that meet above 
average standards in areas such as the protection of the environment, the promotion of 
human rights, or the sustainability of investments. Third, negative and positive screens 
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are often combined, yielding the so-called “transversal” (Capelle-Blancard and Monjon, 
2014), “sustainable” or “triple bottom line” (“people, planet and profit”) screens. Finally, 
the fourth generation of SRI funds combines the sustainable investing approach (third 
generation) with shareholder activism. In this approach, portfolio managers attempt to 
influence their portfolio companies’ policies through direct engagement with the 
management/board of directors or through using voting rights at annual shareholder 
meetings. 
The existing literature offers conflicting evidence in terms of the financial returns 
of activism. English, Smythe and McNeil (2004) argue that the effect of activism is only 
cursory, finding an effect in the first six months following the announcement of activism 
and diminishing afterwards. Nelson (2006) concludes that abnormal returns are 
insignificant for any time window, once confounding effects are controlled for. Greenwood 
and Schor (2009) report that returns to activism are positive only for the cases where 
targeted companies are acquired as a result of activism. In a survey paper, Gillan and 
Starks (2007) find no positive effect of activism in the long run, and no convincing 
evidence of a causal relation between activism and performance. In contrast, some studies 
show evidence of beneficial activism. One of the first on institutional investor activism 
was Smith (1996) who studied the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS) that was able to use activism as a way to generate shareholder wealth (the 
“CalPERS effect”), but had no effect on operating performance. Using information from 
13-D filings, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008) document that firms targeted by 
activist hedge funds in the US have abnormal returns of 7% around the announcement of 
activism, and that there is no reversal in returns in the subsequent year. Bebchuk, Brav 
and Jiang (2015) find no evidence of reversals in the five-year period subsequent to the 
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13-D filings, and lasting improvements in operating performance.2 
Investor activism is not always conducted publicly: influential and major 
shareholders (institutional investors, families and individuals, corporations) may be active 
behind the scenes. In a case study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, Becht et al. (2009) find 
evidence that activism through private channels creates significant returns and increases 
operating performance in periods before the market is aware of what is actually going on 
behind the scenes. Doidge et al. (2015) confirm, for a sample of Canadian institutional 
investors, that engaging companies through private channels increases shareholder value.  
Another body of literature evaluating the performance of SRI funds (see, e.g., 
Margolis, Elfenbein and Walsh (2011) and Barko and Renneboog (2016) for 
comprehensive overviews), which indicates that SRI funds at best perform on par with 
their market benchmarks or their conventionally managed counterparts. Krueger (2013) 
shows that stock prices react to the release of CSR news, especially when it is negative. 
A few papers show that some SRI funds are able to outperform: Gil-Bazo, Ruiz-Verdu 
and Santos (2010) demonstrate that specialized management SRI firms, that perform 
active portfolio selection, are able to outperform conventional mutual funds3 and Gibson 
and Krueger (2017) show that funds’ investment strategies based on sustainability are 
related to the chosen investment horizon and yield positive risk-adjusted returns. The 
pressure on individual firms to address ESG issues has been highlighted in the US SIF 
                                         
2 However, Cremers, Giambona, Sepe and Wang (2015) find that firms targeted by activist hedge funds 
have similar stock returns and lower increases in Tobin’s Q compared to ex-ante similar firms that were 
not targeted by activist hedge funds, suggesting that while activist hedge funds may have stock-picking 
ability, it is less clear whether their activism, on average, causes improvements in firm performance. 
3 This is in line with the findings of Cremers and Petajisto (2009), who show that mutual funds’ 




(2014) and Eurosif (2014) reports, which state that about 28% and 40% of institutional 
investors filed ESG-related requests to their portfolio companies in the US and Europe, 
respectively. Among these institutions, it is predominantly mutual funds and pension 
funds that contact companies regarding environmental and social issues (Dyck, Lins, Roth 
and Wagner, 2015).  
Using a proprietary sample of U.S. activist files, Dimson et al. (2015) uncover that 
successful engagements in social and environmental topics induce positive returns and 
improvements in operating performance and corporate governance. Hoepner et al. (2016) 
find that ESG activism reduces left tail firm risk, especially when target firms respond 
with material actions to the activist’s requests. Looking at shareholder proxy proposals, 
Flammer (2015) documents that proposals that pass only by a small margin, generate 
significant returns and superior long-term accounting performance. It is not ex-ante clear 
that specific activist tactics are effective across countries. One reason is that legal rules 
and corporate orientations toward shareholders or stakeholders (and the resulting 
regulation regarding ESG issues) as well as the voluntary adoption of CSR policies (e.g., 
reflecting social preferences or institutional development) differ across countries, inducing 
varying levels of CSR performance (Liang and Renneboog, 2017).  
3. Data 
3.1.  Engagement data 
We have obtained a proprietary database on investor activism from a large 
European asset manager with more than $250 billion in total net assets under 
management. The activist has offices and manages funds across Europe, North America 
and Asia, and has long had a focus on ESG-specific investments. The activist mainly 
manages mutual funds and pension funds, has a specialized team of analysts that combines 
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both in-house and independent third-party research to identify companies that have room 
for improvement in their ESG policies. Our database covers the universe of their 
completed engagement cases over the period starting in the third quarter of 2005 through 
the end of 2014. This enables us to test differences in engagement techniques and 
corresponding outcomes. As Liang and Renneboog (2017) show, there is an important 
difference in the perception and implementation of CSR across countries with different 
legal, political and historical origins, such that the findings for one region do not 
necessarily apply to another. Therefore, we split the sample into three distinct regions 
based on the corporate domiciles: North America, Europe, and Other (mostly Asia-
Pacific) companies. Engaged companies are all either part of the MSCI All-Cap World 
Index or a major regional or country index. In total, our database has 847 completed 
engagement sequences involving 660 different companies. 
The asset manager employs a specialized ESG-team that screens companies around 
the world. An activist case starts with the identification of a concern where the target 
company can improve upon its ESG practices. The engagement team relies on its own 
research, as well as reports published by specialized research companies and institutes 
(e.g., the environmental report of the World Bank or the UN Global Compact Monitor). 
An engagement case can also be triggered by some unforeseen event or crisis, where the 
engager screens a firm’s ESG policies and concludes that they are insufficient to deal with 
the crisis and hence requests changes to address it. A prominent example is the 2010 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, which BP arguably could have avoided 
or mitigated if they had had clearly formulated environmental and disaster contingency 
plans in place (Watkins, 2010), and that has triggered policy adjustments in the energy 
sector and enhanced scrutiny by the providers of CSR performance scores and activists.  
At the initiation of an engagement, the activist formulates a clearly defined 
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objective. We first partition the engagement cases into two groups based on the 
engagement’s objectives, distinguishing those aimed at (i) changing the operations of the 
firm, e.g. implementing new environmental technology for better water management, or 
board-restructuring (“reorganization”-oriented engagements), versus at (ii) providing more 
information on specific ESG dimensions, e.g. these typically involve requests for better 
reporting standards, such as the publication of a detailed sustainability report 
(“transparency”-oriented engagements). Each of these engagement categories can be 
further partitioned according to which of the E, S, and G dimensions was the main 
dimension of interest.  
At the start of an engagement, the activist also decides whether to carry out the 
engagement alone or in a coalition with one or more other activists, and whom to contact 
at the company. Typical contact persons in the engaged firm include executive and non-
executive management (such as the CEO, investor relations personnel, and ESG 
representatives). The activist in this study has a self-imposed deadline of three years to 
achieve the desired outcome. If a successful outcome is reached, it usually occurs within 
20 months. 
The ESG-team gives advice to its own in-house fund managers (of both SRI and 
conventional funds) but also works on commissioned cases on behalf of consulting clients’ 
portfolios (as the asset manager also manages external investment funds). The activist 
typically does not own a major block surpassing the 5% reporting threshold, such that 
the activist is generally not required to file 13-D reports in the US. 
In an environmentally-related example, the engager contacted a large French 
cosmetics and beauty company regarding their use of palm oil, after a major UK retailer 
announced a ban on palm oil products coming from unsustainable sources. The engager 
was concerned that this ban and the skeptical attitude towards the use palm oil would 
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affect the competitive position of the company in its industry, and requested clarification 
regarding the use of palm oil in its products. The company provided the requested 
information, demonstrating that it was only a minor user of palm oil and that it was 
purchasing its supplies from sustainably managed sources. The activist asked the company 
to provide this information on its website. After the company complied and published a 
detailed sustainability report with a special focus on environmental reporting 
(demonstrating that its potential liability in relation to palm-olive concerns was very 
limited), this transparency case was successfully closed. This example shows two elements 
typical for the engagement cases in our sample: first, there is always a trigger for 
engagements that can be either a significant event, the surfacing of new information, or 
changes in the regulatory or competitive environment. Second, the engager formulates a 
specific request and the engagement team follows through with that request and makes 
sure that all requirements are fulfilled by the engaged company before the file can be 
successfully closed. In Appendix A, we provide some more illustrations for each main ESG 
dimension. 
For each engagement sequence, we verify that the “successful” closure of the 
engagement case is indeed determined by the ESG criteria set initially by the activist. 
Furthermore, we cross-reference outcomes with Factiva records and company websites to 
check the validity of registered outcomes. We find no evidence that the data include 
erroneous reporting. 
 
3.2. Company-level data 
We obtain our firm-level data from a variety of sources: accounting and stock 
return data are from Datastream, ESG performance indicators from Asset4 (available 
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through Datastream), analyst coverage data from I/B/E/S, and ownership data from 
Morningstar and Orbis. We merge the data from different sources using ISINs, 
Datastream Codes, and I/B/E/S identifiers, and cross-check, by means of company 
names, that all available data are properly matched. We use the international industry 
return data from Kenneth French’s website to calculate abnormal returns. We define 
industries in various ways, following the classification on French’s website for 10, 17 and 
49 major industry groups, depending on the availability of a suitable control firm (see 
below). All variable definitions and their respective sources are provided in Appendix C. 
4. Engagement characteristics 
The engagement cases are categorized into three themes based on the underlying 
goal, environmental, social, or governance. Within each theme, the engager distinguishes 
among a variety of topics and subtopics,4 of which we show the frequency of occurrence 
in Panel A of Table 1. This panel also exhibits the percentage of successfully closed 
engagement files, the number of contacts between engager and target firm, the length of 
engagement sequence, and the main contact type. The table shows that the engager 
focuses mostly on environmental and social topics, making up 42.3% and 43.3% of the 847 
cases, respectively. About 60 percent of the cases are closed successfully5, varying by topic: 
firms are most responsive to engagements regarding public health issues, labor standards, 
climate change, reporting standards, and corporate governance issues. The average 
number of contacts with targeted firms and the average length of the engagement process 
                                         
4 A more detailed overview for the subthemes is presented in Appendix B. In order to keep things tractable 
and to avoid working with very small subsamples, in the multivariate analysis we will focus on the three 
main ESG topics (for which we also distinguish between reorganization and transparency cases). 
5 A success rate of 60% is higher than the one reported in Dimson et al. (2015); our sample covers a different 
time period. A high success rate in activist cases is not unprecedented as, for example, Klein and Zur (2009) 
report a success rate of 60% and 65% for hedge fund and private equity activists, respectively. 
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are, respectively, higher and lower for successful cases than for unsuccessful ones. The 
most frequently used means of contact is a formal letter or email; in case of public health 
issues, the engager and the firm often meet and, in case of corporate governance 
engagements, the activist takes the issue to the annual or extraordinary shareholder 
meeting about half the time.  
In Panel B, we further break down the engagements by ESG theme by 
distinguishing between: (i) the aim of the engagement – triggering reorganization (board 
or asset restructuring, or operational changes), versus enhancing transparency (see section 
3.1), and (ii) whether the engaged firm is initially open to the activist’s demand (in this 
case, “receptiveness” equals one) versus whether the firm initially resists the demand (in 
which case “receptiveness” equals zero). Initial receptiveness of the activist’s demands by 
management does not necessarily imply success at the end of the engagement period; this 
variable just measures the willingness of companies to start a conversation with the 
activist.  
Overall, about 51.5% of engagements aim at inducing a material change in 
company policy (reorganization), and two thirds of the engaged companies are initially 
receptive to the engager’s request and participate in an initial discussion (Panel B). When 
we study the percentage of successful cases over time (by year of engagement initiation), 
we observe that success rates by year vary between 61% and 78% (with exception of 2009 
when the highest number of cases were initiated and the subsequent success dropped to 
33%, for which the financial crisis may be responsible).6   
We also examine the frequency of the various forms of communication between 
engager and target. Out of the nearly 3,000 activities recorded in the case files, public 
channels (such as annual or extraordinary general meetings and press releases) account 
                                         
6 Table available upon request.  
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for only 170 (or 5.6%) of the instances, and these are mainly corporate governance cases. 
One third of the contacts occurred via email, 18.5% by means of a letter, 11.4% via a 
conference call, and in 10.9% of the cases, a personal meeting took place (in 2.8% of the 
cases at the firm’s premises, and in 8.1% of the cases firm representatives came to one of 
the engager’s offices).7 Over the whole sample period, the number of contacts between 
targets and the engager across all activist cases has stayed steady. Out of the 17 Fama-
French industries, oil and petroleum firms, as well as financials are engaged the most (93 
and 86 cases, respectively), followed by pharmaceuticals, utilities, and retail companies. 
In terms of geographical focus, 54% of the targets are from Europe, 24% from North-
America, 16% from the Asia-Pacific region, and the remainder from Latin-America or 
Africa. 
–Insert Table 1 about here– 
 
5. Engaging target firms 
5.1.  Matching methodology  
To examine the determinants of the activist’s decision, we first consider the 
characteristics of target companies in the year preceding the engagement relative to a 
matched sample, in order to mitigate the possibility that any observed ESG changes 
would have happened without the engagements. Our matching pool is the entire universe 
of companies included in the Thomson Reuters Asset4 ESG database, which contains 
firms that are included in major indices such as MSCI World, MSCI Europe, DJ Stoxx600, 
NASDAQ100, Russell 1000, FTSE250, and ASX 300, and which comprises more than 
                                         
7 Table available upon request.  
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4,200 stocks. The Asset4 ESG database has several advantages. First, it is an international 
index with broad coverage of large international companies, and contains virtually all our 
sample firms. Second, this database provides dynamic ESG performance scores that are 
given by a rating agency that is independent from the engager, and that thus allows us 
to examine whether the engagements lead to ESG changes that are captured by outsiders. 
Third, Thomson Reuters is a for-profit organization that is paid by the (SRI) investors 
for access to its ESG ratings rather than by the rated companies, which implies that 
rating shopping is unlikely to be an issue (as opposed to, for example, credit ratings where 
issuers pay for the ratings, see Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009). 
To construct the matched sample, we take several steps. First, we exclude all 
engaged companies that are also part of the Asset4 database. Second, we restrict the pool 
to industries based on the 49 Fama-French industry group classification. Third, we 
calculate the Mahalanobis distance score for each possible engaged and matching company 
combination based on size, market-to-book ratio, ESG score, and ROA in the year prior 
to the engagement. The advantage of this matching method is that we do not impose a 
hierarchy on the matching variables by sequentially sorting companies into portfolios. 
Furthermore, the Mahalanobis distance score is not sensitive to the scaling of the data 
and performs well with a small number of matching covariates (Stuart, 2010). The 
outcome of the matching procedure, the Mahalanobis score, is an intuitive measure that 
takes the covariance of matching variables into account (and that reduces to the Euclidean 
distance if the covariances are equal to zero). We cannot find a match based on 49 
industries for 14 engaged firms, for which we relax the set of possible matches based on 
17 (rather than 49) industries. After calculating the score for each company in our 
universe, we pick the three companies with the lowest distance metric from the engaged 
company as the controls. For companies that have multiple engagement cases, we keep 
the same set of matching companies for subsequent engagements. As a robustness test, 
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we re-estimate all our multivariate analyses with (i) a single best match, and (ii) other 
matching methods based on propensity scores (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003), but do not 
report these results as they lead to similar conclusions.  
5.2. Univariate results 
We present summary statistics for target and matching firm characteristics in 
Table 2, testing the difference in means and medians between the engaged and matching 
sample using a paired t-test and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, respectively. To test the 
difference between the means of the engaged and the control sample, we create a “pseudo-
company” for each engaged company using the equally-weighted mean of three matched 
companies, as in Brav et al. (2008) or Dimson et al. (2015). The pseudo-company 















 represents a characteristic variable for a pseudo-company for each engaged 
company i and ijX ,  is the characteristic variable for each matched company 1,...,3=j . All 
variables definitions and their respective sources are provided in Appendix C. 
 –Insert Table 2 about here–  
 
ESG performance. As explained above, we use ratings provided by Thomson 
Reuters Asset4 that capture the ESG attributes of target and matching companies. The 
“aggregate” ESG rating is the equally-weighted average of the following four underlying 
sub-ratings or pillars: environmental, social, governance, and economic outlook issues. The 
first three refer to the usual topics of ESG, while the economic pillar addresses the 
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financial performance and economic outlook. We document in Table 2 that, both at the 
aggregate ESG level and the individual pillar level, engaged companies have significantly 
higher ESG scores than non-engaged firms. This observation is similar to Dimson et al. 
(2015), who also find that engaged companies already have a higher standards of corporate 
governance in place prior to investor activism. We also use a modified version of the 
Entrenchment index (E-index) of Bebchuk et al. (2009); out of their six proposed 
governance provisions, we include poison pills, golden parachutes, staggered boards, and 
supermajority for bylaws and mergers, as Asset4 only records these variables for all 
companies. We find, that on average, engaged firms do not have a different aggregate 
level of these governance provisions than non-engaged firms. 
Risk and performance. The annual stock returns of engaged companies are not 
statistically different from the matched, non-engaged firms, while the engaged firms 
exhibit lower stock return volatility and greater liquidity. They also have somewhat higher 
accounting returns, sales growth, Tobin’s Q, and interest coverage. Economically, 
however, these differences are modest. Engaged companies have somewhat higher market 
share in their respective industries. Other variables (profit margin, sales growth, asset 
turnover) do not differ. 
Cash and expenses. Free cash flow and cash holding figures are comparable 
across the two samples (Table 2). Engaged companies have slightly lower capital 
expenditures as a fraction of total assets (0.4%), spend more on advertising, and pay out 
more in the form of dividends both in absolute terms and as a percentage of their net 
income. Cash holdings, free cash flows, and operating expenses do not differ from those 
of matched firms.  
Size and capital structure. Engaged companies are significantly larger, in terms 
of assets, sales and market value of equity, although they have significantly fewer tangible 
18 
 
assets. Their book leverage is similar to that of their matched peers. 
Ownership. Table 2 also reveals that the average holding of our activist engager 
is small but still significantly higher in engaged firms than in its matched counterparts. 
Engaged companies have fewer blockholders (owning a stake of 5% or larger), but when 
considering the different types of owners (e.g. financial institutions, industrial companies, 
the government, hedge funds and private equity, individuals and families), we find no 
meaningful differences. The number of blockholders might seem large (Edmans and 
Holderness, 2017), however, this is driven by firms outside of North America. When we 
partition the sample into North American, European and other domiciled firms, we see 
that North American firms, on average, have 3 blockholders, European firms have 4, and 
other, mainly Asian, companies have more than 4. The majority of engaged firms are 
independent companies, with no shareholder controlling 25% or more of the shares 
through direct or indirect holdings.  
5.3. Multivariate results 
In Table 3, we show the results of probit regressions estimating the likelihood of 
being engaged by the activist. We first analyze whether firm size, performance, market 
share, leverage, stock liquidity, cash holdings, dividend yield, capital expenditure, and 
analyst coverage is related to the choice of the targets, while controlling for year, industry, 
and geographic fixed effects. The marginal effects exhibited in column (1) of Table 2 
indicate that our matching procedure was effective, as none of the above variables help 
predict which firms are targeted, with the exception of a smaller size, a higher stock 
market performance, higher product market share, and more analyst coverage. The results 
also show that the asset manager does not generally target companies multiple times, 
which suggests that engagements are evaluated and started on a per-case basis and that 
the activist does not have “favorite” targets.  
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Second, in column 2 we add the percentage of shares owned by the activist prior 
to the engagement, whether the firm is independent (does not have a major blockholder 
controlling at least 25% of the equity), the corporate governance index, and the aggregate 
ESG score. For the sample of all engagement cases, we find that firms with lower ESG 
scores are more likely to be targeted. Economically, the marginal likelihood of -0.103 (z-
statistic of -1.79) implies that a standard deviation decrease in the ESG score (of 23.8) is 
associated with an increase in the likelihood to be targeted of 2.45%, which is a 10% 
increase over the unconditional probability. This shows that the activist tends to target 
companies with more room for improvement in their ESG practice. Ex-ante, it seems 
reasonable to expect greater scope for ESG improvements at firms with low ESG scores. 
In the subsequent columns of Table 3, we separately estimate the likelihood to be 
engaged in the environmental (columns 3-4), social (columns 5-6) and governance 
(columns 7-8) areas. We find that the results from columns 1-2 largely hold, although, in 
case of the governance dimension, companies that have lower potential growth 
opportunities but are profitable (in terms of share price performance) and in which the 
engager has a higher ex ante equity holding are significantly more likely to be contacted 
by the activist.8 Overall, the results indicate that the activist chooses targets that are 
visible firms with large market shares and in which the activist holds a larger share stake. 
The tests on the whole sample indicate that the activist does concentrate on firms in the 
poorest ESG performance category.9 
                                         
8 As a robustness test, we repeat the analysis in the first panels of Table 3 for varying levels of engagement 
whereby the ordering refers to differences in the effort level in engagement. Specifically, we estimate ordered 
probit models, where the dependent variable is one for engagements triggered for reasons of transparency 
(“light engagements”), two for reorganization reasons (“strong engagements”), and zero in case of no 
engagement. In unreported results, we find that previous findings are robust to ordering and, for the strong 
engagements, the coefficients are larger (in absolute terms). 
9 We repeat the analysis of Table 3 with geographical segmentation between North American, European 
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 –Insert Table 3 about here–  
 
6. Engagement success 
In this section, we consider the drivers of “successful” engagements. As we noted 
above, success is not determined by the realization of value that could be triggered by the 
adoption of the activist’s requirements nor does it depend on whether the activist demands 
can be met with little or much effort, but only depends on whether the target complies 
with whatever the activist set as the ex-ante demand. Table 4 explores possible drivers of 
successful engagements, which include (in addition to the variables in Table 3) indicator 
variables for whether or not the activist requests a reorganization effort rather than just 
more transparency (captured by the variable “Reorganization”), whether or not the 
engagement was conducted jointly with other activists (captured by the variable “Joint 
targeting”), whether top executives in the target were contacted by the activist versus 
lower-level managers or non-executive directors (captured by the variable “Contacted 
executives”), the number of contacts over the course of engagements (captured by the 
variable “Number of contacts”) and finally whether any previous engagement was 
successfully concluded (captured by the variable “Success streak”).10 
The results in column 1 reveal that, on average, cases where the activist requests 
the target to make significant changes in terms of board or asset restructuring or a change 
in ESG-related operations is significantly less likely to lead to a successful closure of the 
case by the activist. For example, the coefficient of “Reorganization” equals -0.170, which 
                                         
and other domiciled companies. The analysis is presented in Appendix D, Table D1. We find that the results 
are qualitatively similar. 
10 We repeat the analysis of Table 4 with geographical segmentation between North American, European 
and other domiciled companies. The analysis is presented in Appendix D, Table D2.    
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suggests that such far-reaching requests have a 17% lower likelihood to be successfully 
closed, compared to an overall success rate of 60%. This is not surprising, as the required 
effort level in reorganization engagements is much higher for the firm than in the cases 
where there is only a demand for more transparency and information provision. In general, 
it is easier to achieve “success” in transparency cases but it is questionable whether these 
cases are likely to generate significant value that is subsequently reflected in the stock 
price or the accounting performance. In contrast, reorganization cases may be more likely 
to lead to value enhancement but may also be harder to achieve as they require more 
substantial or far-reaching corporate decisions, which the management may be more 
reluctant to make.  
Returning to column 1 of Table 4, we find that eventual success of the engagement 
is not higher if the activist jointly targets a company with other activists, if executives 
rather than non-executives are the main contact at the target, when the number of 
contacts between the activist and the firm is higher, or when a firm is more visible (a 
larger number of analysts following the firm). Companies that previously implemented 
changes requested by the activists are more likely to do so again. Targets are also more 
likely to meet the activist’s request when their sales growth is lower. In particular, the 
coefficient on “Sales Growth” of -0.244 indicates that a standard deviation decrease in sales 
growth (of 0.290) is associated with an increase in the likelihood of success of 7.1%. 
Next, column 2 examines additional variables capturing governance and ESG 
aspects. We find no persistent relation between engagement success and the proportion 
of the shares owned by the activist and the increases in this equity stake (Holding 
increase) during the engagement process, and the target’s corporate governance (as 
proxied by the aggregate index of shareholder rights provisions – the entrenchment index). 
However, firms with a higher ESG score prior to engagement are more likely to comply 
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with the requests of the activists. The marginal likelihood of 0.448 means that a standard 
deviation increase in ESG ratings is associated with a 10.7% increase in the probability 
of success. This is consistent with the ex-ante ESG score indicating how much firms care 
about ESG issues, or that firms with a stronger ESG track record have the necessary ESG 
resources and know-how largely in place already, such that compliance does not require a 
large departure from existing practices. 
As it is possible that the activist is more likely to selects firms to target where the 
activist anticipates that a successful engagement is more easily achieved, we estimate as 
a robustness analysis a two-stage Heckman model to control for potential selection issues 
with as selection equation model (2) of Panel A of Table 3. We find that the above results 
exhibited in Table 4 carry through, and that selection does not appear to be an issue (as 
the inverse Mills ratio is insignificant in all our specifications). 
When we analyze the outcome of engagement by ESG theme in columns 3-8, we 
find that reorganization requests are less likely to be successful and that previous 
successful engagements only matter for the subset of engagements related to 
environmental issues, but not for social or governance engagements. For environmental 
engagements, large cash holdings are associated with a reduced probability that the case 
is closed successfully, perhaps because large cash holdings occur at corporations that are 
less dependent on external capital markets and that accordingly are less interested in good 
investor relationships. For the subset of social engagements, those at firms with a larger 
market share are more likely to be successful, which suggests that market-leaders in their 
industry are more open to investor engagement or are more worried about potential 
negative media stories. The sensitivity to the engagement is also larger for firms who seem 
under pressure because of lower sales growth. Finally, governance engagements are more 
likely to be successful at firms with low buy-and-hold returns over the past year, which 
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is strongly statistically significant once we control for the entrenchment index and the 
ESG rating in column (8). However, lower stock market performance is not related to a 
higher likelihood of success for environmental or social engagements. This suggests that 
corporations deem investor concerns more relevant when they have performed relatively 
poorly in the stock market, but primarily when faced with governance activism, perhaps 
to forestall more significant shareholder activism.  
 –Insert Table 4 about here–  
 
7. Analysis of performance after engagement 
There are several ways through which implementing or increasing CSR can increase 
firm value. Pro-social behavior can be rewarding for various stakeholders, shareholders, 
as well as the management (Baron, 2008; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006): first, higher ESG 
standards can increase consumer loyalty through product quality signaling, and 
consequently lead to higher market share, as well as higher and less volatile profits 
(Albuquerque et al., 2017). Second, employee satisfaction fosters productivity and 
efficiency, also leading to higher profits (Edmans, 2011; 2012). Third, corporate social 
responsibility can attract a specific shareholder base with long-term investment goals, 
thereby reducing pressure on management to generate short-term profits and allowing 
them to undertake investments that yield returns over a longer time horizon (Gaspar, 
Massa, Matos, Patgiri and Rehman, 2013). Fourth, improved governance standards also 
indicate better management practices and result in higher future performance (Ferrell, 
Liang, and Renneboog, 2016). Finally, investments in CSR could be similar to paying an 
insurance premium to avoid rare events that could harm a firm and which are not priced 
yet (Hong and Liskovich, 2016; Lins, Servaes and Tamayo, 2017).  
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We first test the impact of engagements on the operations and characteristics of 
target firms. We estimate differences-in-differences (DD) specifications (equations (2) and 
(3)) whereby the dependent variables are market-based measures of performance (Tobin’s 
Q), accounting-based measures (ROA, operating expenses, sales growth, profit margin, 
asset turnover), sales market share, investments (CapEx), ownership (long-term holdings, 
toehold stake of the activist), ESG performance (ESG ratings; environmental, social, 
governance scores), corporate governance (entrenchment index), and visibility (analysts 
following), for two treatments, the successful completion of the engagement case (equation 
(2)) and the engagement treatment irrespective of subsequent success (equation (3)):   
,controlssuccesspostsuccesspost=y ,,, ititititit    (2) 
,controlsengagedpostengagedpost=y ,,, ititititit    (3)  
where Post is an indicator variable that equals 1 for the 1-year period following the 
successful closure of a case, and zero otherwise (eq. (2)), or for the 2-year period after the 
engagement and 0 otherwise (eq. (3)). The latter case captures the typical period that the 
engagements last. Equation (2) is estimated for the sample comprising engaged companies 
(both successful and unsuccessful ones), whereas Equation (3) is estimated on the sample 
comprising both engaged companies and non-engaged matched firms.  
We apply the same methodology on various subsamples: the reorganization-
oriented engagements, the quartiles of firms with the lowest and highest ESG scores 
(measured prior to engagement), and the environmental-, social-, and governance-oriented 
cases. In all these specifications, the vector Controls includes leverage, size, tangibility of 
assets, and time and industry fixed effects.11 We cluster standard errors at the firm level.  
For the sake of brevity, we only report the δ coefficients in Table 5, where each 
                                         
11 In the analysis of Tobin’s Q, we also include ROA, CapEx and sales growth. 
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coefficient comes from a separate regression. In Panel A, we report the δ coefficients for 
the evaluation of success for all engagement cases (column 1) and for six subsamples. The 
results indicate that, on average, accounting performance does not significantly change 
following a successful engagement. This is in line with Klein and Zur’s (2011) results that 
hedge fund activism does not improve accounting performance.  
Sales growth, in contrast, improves on average after successful engagements by 3-
22% across virtually all subsamples (with the only exception the subsample of social 
engagements). Given the typical sales growth of 10.1% in the year preceding engagement, 
the overall jump of 7.6% is not only statistically, but also economically quite meaningful. 
The coefficients on the ESG performance ratings confirm that successful 
engagements lead to higher ESG scores for targets with the ex-ante weakest ESG ratings 
(the lowest quartile). The results suggest that if a case is closed successfully with an ex-
ante poorly rated company, the ESG rating on average increases by 10.6, which is a 
significant boost of 13.7% compared to the mean. This growth is most pronounced for 
environmental ratings, where we observe an 18.6% gain relative to the initial rating. 
It is possible that the mere fact that an activist targets a firm generates an effect 
even if the activist does not attain its specific goal over the course of engagement. To 
investigate this issue, we turn to panel B of Table 5, where we also report the DD 
coefficients of an analysis where the treatment effect is engagement (and the non-treated 
sample consists of matched non-engaged firms). As before, we also study the changes in 
corporate and ESG performance as well as some other firm characteristics for the full 
sample and a set of subsamples. We find that the engagement in itself has little impact 
on the ex-post accounting performance (column 1) or any other firm characteristic (with 
exception of the market share, which is a little lower). For example, the increases in sales 
growth that we document for successful cases is not occurring for unsuccessful cases. 
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The subsamples of firms within the lowest versus highest (ex-ante) ESG quartiles 
yield some interesting results: the mere fact of engaging poor ESG targets triggers 
significant increases in their ESG scores (the overall and the sub-scores on E, S, and G 
aspects all augment as well as the economic outlook sub-score which proxies for 
shareholder and customer loyalty). So, the mere engagement, independent of the ultimate 
success of the engagement case, triggers changes in the ESG profile of the target, which 
is picked up by the independent ESG evaluation providers. For the firms in the highest 
ex-ante ESG quartile, we observe the inverse: here, all the ESG scores go down after the 
engagement. This could be the result of an information revelation process: the activist 
conducts research to identify companies with a potential for improvement in one of the 
ESG dimensions. If the activist correctly identifies those companies, then subsequent ESG 
ratings should reflect this new information and the adjusted ESG scores then incorporate 
the potential ESG problem which drives the scores down. This implies that research and 
engagement activity brings new information to market actors and better reveals the ESG 
practices of companies. Previously low-rated companies are not “lost cases” and late best-
performers might still have room for improvement. As the activist engages companies, the 
rating agency generally seems to realize over the course of that engagement that previous 
scores did not incorporate all of the activist’s concerns, i.e., that engaged companies still 
had key ESG points to improve on.12  
–Insert Table 5 about here–  
 
                                         
12 In unreported results, we define the pre- and post-periods of Equations 2 and 3 in various ways. 
Specifically, we move the cutoff 1-3 years after the start of engagements, and 1-3 years after completion. 
The results are qualitatively similar to the ones presented here. 
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8. Returns to engagement 
In this section, we measure buy-and-hold returns (BHRs, which are raw, 
unadjusted cumulative returns) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs, corrected for 
exposure to the global market, size, book-to-market and momentum Fama-French-
Carhart return factors) of the target’s stock during and after the engagement. We use 
stock return data from Datastream and download our factor data from the website of 
Kenneth French. 
In Table 6, we report BHRs for various event windows, i.e., in the month around 
the completion of the engagement (distinguishing between successful versus unsuccessful 
completion), and over time windows of 6 and 12 months following the end of the 
engagement. We find that, on average, BHRs are small but positive and statistically 
significant in the month following the closure of a case (at 0.8%). These positive returns 
stem from the successfully closed cases that generated BHRs of 1.2%, while cases where 
the target firm does not comply do not generate any significant return. Over the period 
of six months after the completion, successful cases generate returns of 4.3%, whereas 
unsuccessful ones incur stock price decreases by 3.1%. Over a one-year time period, we 
still find significant return differences between the successful and non-successful cases.  
We re-estimate these BHRs over the same time windows for different subsamples 
and also report them in Table 6. The target subsamples based on the ex-ante ESG scores 
– the highest or lowest quartiles – do not yield any significant post-engagement financial 
returns, a finding that does not depend on the engagements being (un)successful.  
Successful reorganizations yield BHRs of 2.3% in the month of the completion of 
the engagement and over a longer time window of 6 months; the BHRs of unsuccessful 
reorganization attempts are negative by 3.5%. When we partition the engagement files by 
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ESG dimension, we also find significant differences: over the short run of one month, 
successful engagements of the environmental and governance type trigger statistically 
significant BHRs of 1.8% and 2.9%, respectively, although only the former are different 
from unsuccessful cases. Over the time window of 6 months after the end of the 
engagement, successful environmental, social, and governance engagements outperform 
their unsuccessful counterparts by 10.1%, 4.0%, and 1.6%, respectively. Turning to BHRs 
over one year, governance engagements yield a return of 8.4% on average (but there is no 
statistical difference between successful and unsuccessful ones), and successful social 
engagements are 8.3% higher than the unsuccessful cases (5.8% minus -2.5%).13  
In Figure 1, we depict the mean BHR of equally-weighted portfolios of engaged 
companies, where the portfolios were created one month prior to the event month and the 
returns are calculated over the subsequent 18 months. The return difference between 
successful and unsuccessful cases is highest for the period 6 to 12 months following the 
completion. Figures depicting the mean BHR over 18 months after the completion of the 
engagement for the subsamples of engaged North-American, European, and Other (mainly 
Asia-Pacific) firms, respectively, exhibit a similar picture (not shown)14. For North-
American and European firms, the BHRs gradually increase and level off after about 8-9 
months, and the difference in BHRs between (un)successful engagement firms is at the 
maximum between 6 and 12 months. For the Other subsample, the average BHR across 
all firms gradually declines over 5 months, but the returns of the unsuccessful cases decline 
faster than the successful ones. 
                                         
13 We repeat the analysis of Table 6, for the subsamples of North-American, European, and Other cases. 
The results are largely in line with the ones reported for the overall sample (although some subsamples 
partitioned based on geographic and (un)successfulness become small). The results are available upon 
request.  




 –Insert Table 6 and Figure 1 about here–  
 
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the three different time 
windows following the completion of engagements (as in Table 6) using the four-factor 
global Fama-French-Carhart model. We do so for all engaged firms and for the subsamples 
with successful and unsuccessful ones, and by subtracting the CARs from those of their 
matched firms, we obtain excess CARs (ECARs) that we report in Table 7.15 The top 
panel shows that the average ECARs are positive, close to zero (0.5%) but still 
significantly different from zero in the month after the completion of the engagement (be 
it successful or unsuccessful). This means that the engaged firms slightly outperform the 
non-engaged ones. This difference increases to 2.7% in the 6-month period after the 
engagement file is closed (but there is no difference between successful or unsuccessful 
completion of the cases). The firms of which the activist demands a reorganization 
outperform the matched firms by 4.4% in the six months after the closure of the activist’s 
case (but the difference between successfully or unsuccessfully closed files is not 
statistically significant).  
Turning to the firms in the lowest (ex ante) ESG quartile, we find that these firms 
outperform the matched firms by 7.1% (7.5%) in the 6 months (1 year) after the activist 
ends the engagement. These successfully engaged low-ESG firms outperform the firms of 
which the activist closed the file unsuccessfully: successful firms have an average ECAR 
of 8.4% over the 6-month period (and outperform the unsuccessful ones by 2.4%) and of 
11.3% over the year (and outperform the unsuccessful firms by 6.8%). This implies that 
it is important to target low ESG firms as they then significantly outperform their not-
                                         
15 As a robustness check, we also use Fama-French-Carhart factors, 17 Fama-French industry portfolios, as 
well as size and book-to-market matched portfolios. We find that the results are qualitatively similar. 
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engaged peers. This pattern is not visible for engaged firms with an (ex-ante) high ESG 
classification; they do not obtain significant ECARs. Firms targeted for environmental or 
governance deficiencies exhibit significant and positive ECARs of 3% (over a 6-month 
period) and 14.1% (over a one-year period), respectively.16  
Figure 2 corroborates the findings in Table 7: the CARs for the successful 
engagements remain flat for about 6-7 months, where after the CARs decline. The 
decrease in CARs for unsuccessful cases sets in after about one month since completion. 
The gap in the CARs between successful and unsuccessful cases reaches a maximum after 
about 8-12 months. For North-American successfully engaged targets, the CARs remain 
positive until about 9 months and then rapidly decline whereas the CARs of the 
unsuccessful cases goes down after 2 months, showing a big gap in CARs after about 8-9 
months. For European targets, there is hardly a difference in CARs between (un)successful 
targets; their CARs gradually decrease after about 9 months.17  
Taken together, the results in Table 6 and 7 imply that the activist can make a 
modest return provided he sells his share stake in the successfully target 6 to 12 months 
after closing the case and within 3 months in unsuccessfully engaged firms.18  
 –Insert Table 7 and Figure 2 about here–  
                                         
16 Given that the activist focuses mostly on the E and S factors and less on governance, the subsample of 
(un)successful cases is rather small which may explain the reason why the unsuccessfully closed cases yield 
higher ECARs than the successful ones). 
17 The analysis on subsamples based on regions is not shown for reasons of conciseness but is available upon 
request.  
18 A natural extension of this work is to look into the portfolio holdings of the activist in more detail. Since 
the activists’ primary objective is to generate financial returns through their stock holdings and 
engagements, it is important to further investigate their holdings and check if there is a different point in 
time when they realize returns, not when they actually close the file. The available data on fund holding 
changes are not sufficiently precise – we would need daily data – to enable us to a return calculation at the 





 By means of a large detailed, global dataset comprising the aspects the activism 
on corporate social responsibility that takes place behind the scenes by a major investment 
fund, we analyze the reasons and success of corporate engagement. We match each 
engaged firm with three firms that were not engaged and are most similar to the engaged 
firms in terms of size, market-to-book ratio, ROA, and ESG score in the year prior to the 
engagement and belong to the same industry. 
The activist generally targets large firms with large market shares. Targeted firms 
are more likely to be in the highest ex-ante ESG quartile, which is somewhat surprising 
as one would expect the activist to concentrate on firms with poor ESG performance if 
ESG improvements are expected to be related to the generation of value. Relative to the 
matched sample, target firms have a higher stock market performance, a higher product 
market share, and are more visible (have more analyst coverage). The firms that are 
engaged on corporate governance issues are somewhat smaller, have a dispersed ownership 
structure, have lower potential growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q) but are otherwise 
profitable (both in terms of previous year buy-and-hold returns and accounting 
performance).  
Next, we study whether the engagement is successfully completed or not. The 
definition of success is the activist’s and reflects whether the target firm has complied 
with the activist’s demands. One could question the relevance of this definition, 
considering that in some cases compliance may require little effort from the firm. In other 
cases, the target is asked to make substantial changes in terms of board or asset 
restructuring or in ESG-related operations, which is less likely to lead to a successful 
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closure of the case. It is hence not surprising that when a “hard” engagement occurs, the 
likelihood of successful engagement is lower than in cases just requiring more ESG 
transparency and information provision. Eventual success of the engagement does not 
depend on joint targeting nor on who is the main contact in the target firm (management 
or non-executive directors). More intensive contact between the activist and the target 
does yield success more frequently, though only for European targets. Also, companies 
that were targeted in the past and complied with the activist’s requests are also more 
likely to do so again. European firms under pressure - with declines in sales and negative 
buy-and-hold returns - more frequency adopt the activist’s suggestions. Our results also 
reveal that firms with a good ESG track record prior to engagement (e.g. the firms in the 
highest ESG performance quartile in North-America and Europe) are more likely to 
comply with the requests of the activists. Firms that did not care much about ESG issues 
continue to do so as they seem reluctant to adopt the suggestions by the CSR activist. 
The real effects of engagement of the target firm are rather modest. Our differences-
in-differences analyses reveal that, on average, accounting performance measures and its 
components do not significantly improve after engagement. The only exception are sales, 
which significantly grow after the engagement, both statistically and economically.  
Interestingly, the mere engagement – independent of the ultimate success of the 
engagement case – triggers changes in the ESG profile of the target, which is picked up 
by the independent ESG evaluation providers. Firms with poor ex-ante ESG performance 
scores obtain higher ESG score, whereas for the firms in the highest ex-ante ESG quartile 
we observe the inverse change: here, all the ESG scores go down after the engagement. If 
the activist correctly identifies companies with an ESG problem, then subsequent ESG 
ratings may reflect this new information and the adjusted ESG scores then incorporate 
the potential ESG problem, which drives the scores down. Previously low-rated companies 
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are not “lost cases” and late best-performers might still have room for improvement. As 
the activist engages companies, the rating agency seems to realize that previous scores 
did not incorporate all of the activist’s concerns in that engaged companies still had key 
ESG points to improve on. 
From the activist’s perspective, the activism seems to come with, at best, modest 
financial returns the period immediately following the successful closing of the cases, 
though we find no evidence that targets are negatively affected by the activism. On 
average, the buy-and-hold returns for completed engagement are small, but still positive 
and statistically significant in the month following the closure of a case (at 0.8%). These 
returns can be dissected into positive returns that stem from the successfully closed cases 
(generating BHRs of 1.2%) and zero BHRs for unsuccessful engagements. Over longer 
time windows (e.g. six months), successful cases generate returns of 4.3% whereas 
unsuccessful ones incur stock price decreases by 3.1%. Further extending the time period 
to one year, reveals strong return differences between the successful and non-successful 
cases. Successful reorganizations, which require most compliance effort from the target, 
yield BHRs of 2.3% in the month the completion of the engagement, and over a longer 
time window of 6 months, the BHRs of unsuccessful reorganization attempts are negative 
by 3.5%.  
When we partition the engagement files by ESG dimension, we find significant 
differences: the largest BHRs are generated by successfully engaging targets on 
environmental and governance issues (the one-month BHRs amount to 1.8% and 2.9%, 
respectively). Over the time window of 6 months after the end of the engagement, 
successful environmental, social, and governance engagements outperform their 
unsuccessful counterparts by 10.1%, 4.0%, and 1.6%, respectively. When we turn to BHRs 
over one year, we report that governance engagement yield a return of 8.4%, and that 
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successful social engagements are 8.3% higher than the unsuccessful cases.  
The BHRs calculated over the 18 months starting one month prior to the 
engagement diverge most for successful and unsuccessful engagement for the period 6 to 
12 months following the completion of the case.  
An analysis of excess cumulative abnormal returns, controlling for exposure to 
global market, size, book-to-market and momentum factors, and measured relative to the 
CARs of matched peer firms, shows that that the engaged firms slightly outperform the 
non-engaged ones: the average ECARs are positive (0.5%) and significantly different from 
zero in the month after the completion of the engagement, and augment to 2.7% over the 
6-month period after the engagement file is closed. Reorganization demands by the activist 
make a targeted firm outperform its non-targeted (but otherwise similar) peer-company 
by 4.4% in the six months after the completion of the activist’s case. Targeting firms in 
the lowest (ex-ante) ESG quartile pays off in the sense that these firms outperform their 
matched peers by 7.1% (7.5%) in the 6 months (1 year) after the activist ends the 
engagement. Furthermore, successfully engaged low-ESG firms outperform the 
unsuccessfully engaged low-ESG firms; the former have average ECAR of 8.4% over the 
6-month period (and outperform the unsuccessful ones by 2.4%) and of 11.3% over the 
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11. Figures and tables
Figure 1: Buy-and-hold returns after completion. The figure shows buy-and-hold returns for an




























Panel A: All cases
Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal returns after completion. The figure shows cumulative
abnormal returns for equally weighted portfolio of engaged companies and above a matched
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
This table reports summary statistics for all variables. For each case, we keep the first firm-year observation and use a lag of
one year. The control sample is determined by Mahalonobis distance metric matching. For all engaged companies, we draw 3
matching pairs with replacement. The Mahalanobis distance is determined based on industry, ESG score, size, market-to-book
ratio and ROA. The t-statics stand for the difference in means between the engaged and the control group. The Z-score is
calculated for the Wilcoxon signed rank test, for which we use the median difference between the engaged firm and the control
group. For the t-statistics and Z-scores we report p-values in brackets. Variables are winsorized at 2.5% on both tails of the
distribution. All variable definitions are in the Appendix.
All cases Control Difference
Variable Obs. Mean Sdev. 25% Median 75% Obs. Mean t-test Rank
ESG ratings
ESG score 705 77.315 23.821 70 88.520 94.010 2,337 67.861 [0.000] [0.000]
Environmental score 705 74.627 25.317 63.900 86.990 93.030 2,336 67.412 [0.000] [0.000]
Social score 705 76.913 23.534 67.860 86.770 94.010 2,336 67.194 [0.000] [0.000]
Governance score 705 64.412 26.324 45.940 73.910 85.530 2,336 57.244 [0.000] [0.000]
Economic score 705 71.345 26.151 54.780 81.480 92.660 2,336 63.508 [0.000] [0.000]
E-index 641 0.376 0.252 0.250 0.250 0.500 1,988 0.360 [0.136] [0.151]
Risk and performance
Buy-and-hold return 833 0.075 0.459 -0.209 0.067 0.290 2,544 0.052 [0.224] [0.835]
Volatility 826 0.324 0.183 0.185 0.280 0.409 2,530 0.327 [0.609] [0.001]
Amihud ILLIQ 827 0.176 0.851 0 0 0.002 2,452 0.164 [0.703] [0.000]
Asset turnover 846 0.848 0.566 0.460 0.760 1.130 2,544 0.827 [0.375] [0.371]
Profit margin 841 0.080 0.147 0.035 0.071 0.123 2,537 0.083 [0.637] [0.177]
ROA 846 0.059 0.064 0.020 0.052 0.090 2,544 0.053 [0.009] [0.000]
ROE 846 0.157 0.166 0.086 0.152 0.235 2,544 0.133 [0.000] [0.000]
Sales growth 835 0.101 0.290 -0.061 0.079 0.219 2,534 0.109 [0.445] [0.020]
Market share 847 0.028 0.030 0.004 0.015 0.048 2,544 0.017 [0.000] [0.000]
Market-to-book 843 2.578 1.986 1.338 1.982 3.202 2,544 2.361 [0.001] [0.255]
Tobin’s Q 843 1.977 1.284 1.124 1.604 2.392 2,544 1.891 [0.073] [0.033]
Cash and expenses
Cash holding 846 0.066 0.073 0.019 0.041 0.084 2,544 0.067 [0.771] [0.000]
CapEX 846 0.053 0.046 0.021 0.041 0.075 2,544 0.057 [0.060] [0.000]
Operating expenses 817 0.862 0.128 0.806 0.881 0.938 2,532 0.862 [0.933] [0.779]
Size and capital structure
Log total assets 846 9.623 1.858 8.461 9.862 11.060 2,544 9.293 [0.000] [0.000]
Log sales 841 9.146 1.719 8.177 9.549 10.617 2,537 8.798 [0.000] [0.000]
Log market equity 843 9.164 1.752 8.095 9.486 10.802 2,544 8.907 [0.000] [0.000]
Book leverage 846 0.327 0.220 0.161 0.302 0.461 2,544 0.320 [0.381] [0.408]
Tangibility ratio 845 0.313 0.234 0.119 0.271 0.479 2,538 0.338 [0.010] [0.000]
Other
Dividend yield 843 0.029 0.027 0.011 0.024 0.040 2,544 0.026 [0.012] [0.138]
Dividend payout 846 0.389 0.508 0.121 0.325 0.525 2,544 0.353 [0.070] [0.756]
Company age 845 51.850 52.544 14 37 81 2,544 52.573 [0.681] [0.000]
Analysts 810 19.076 10.621 11 19 27 2,502 14.169 [0.000] [0.000]
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
All cases Control Difference
Variable Obs. Mean Sdev. 25% Median 75% Obs. Mean t-test Rank
Ownership
Holding of engager 847 0.002 0.002 0 0.001 0.002 2,544 0.001 [0.051] [0.580]
Average ownership 847 0.048 0.077 0.011 0.019 0.048 2,544 0.046 [0.314] [0.000]
Blockholders 847 3.851 1.813 3 4 5 2,544 4.092 [0.001] [0.000]
Funds 847 0.018 0.068 0 0 0 2,544 0.015 [0.196] [0.000]
Hedge fund & PE 847 0.009 0.020 0 0.003 0.007 2,544 0.010 [0.172] [0.000]
Individuals 847 0.018 0.068 0 0 0 2,544 0.015 [0.196] [0.000]
Independent firm 829 0.840 0.367 1 1 1 2,498 0.848 [0.547] [0.000]
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Table 3: Analysis of targeting by engagement themes
This table reports the marginal effects obtained from probit regressions on the probability of targeting relative to a matched
sample, where the dependent variable is 1 if a company if targeted and 0 otherwise. The first two columns report regression
results for the whole sample of engagements (1-2), while the second, third and fourth set of columns refer to Environmental
(3-4), Social (5-6) and Governance (7-8) cases, respectively. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the respective
independent variable. The variable ”ESG score” is the equal ESG rating for the full sample and the corresponding score for
each specific engagement theme, expressed as a percentage. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The matching
sample is determined by Mahalanobis score matching on industry, size, market-to-book, ESG and ROA. Variable definitions
are provided in the Appendix. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Full sample Environmental Social Governance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log total assets -0.033*** -0.009 -0.001 0.012 -0.015** 0.005 -0.017*** -0.028***
Tobin’s Q -0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.006 -0.015*** -0.025***
Sales growth 0.001 -0.045 0.002 -0.014 -0.034 -0.053 0.025 0.014
BHR over 12 months 0.084*** 0.114*** 0.014 0.020 0.044*** 0.060*** 0.029*** 0.050***
ROA 0.146 0.034 0.045 -0.028 0.094 0.058 0.001 -0.001
Sales market share 3.838*** 3.453*** 1.114*** 0.915** 1.783*** 1.403*** 0.798*** 1.040***
Cash holding -0.005 0.050 0.066 0.032 -0.017 0.043 0.017 0.076
Book leverage 0.018 0.036 0.052 0.046 -0.053 -0.029 0.005 0.008
Dividend yield 0.600 1.451** 0.233 0.633** 0.214 0.564 0.252 0.528***
CapEX 0.014 -0.020 0.190 0.197 -0.177 -0.322 -0.127 -0.095
Amihud ILLIQ 0.001 -0.354* -0.027 -0.185** 0.009 -0.097 -0.011 -0.512
Analysts 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.004***
Previous engagement -0.014 -0.019** -0.025*** -0.030*** -0.004 -0.004 0.008*** 0.009***
Holding of engager 4.276 1.327 0.936 1.898***
Independent company 0.032 0.008 0.018 0.018





Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Geographic FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.27 0.33
N 3,174 2,478 3,174 2,478 3,174 2,478 3,174 2,478
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Table 4: Analysis of success
This table reports the marginal effects obtained from linear probability regressions on the probability of success. The dependent
variable equals 1 if the engagement is successful and 0 otherwise. The first two columns report regression results for the whole
sample of engagements (1-2), while the second, third and fourth set of columns refer to environmental (3-4), social (5-6) and
governance (7-8) cases, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The dummy “Reorganization” takes the
value 1 for reorganization cases and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable “Joint targeting” equals one for cases where the engager
contacts the company with a group of other activists. The variable “Contacted executives” is 1 if executive management is
contacted and 0 otherwise. “Number of activities” and ”Success streak” refer to the number of contacts per case and the
number of previous successful cases with the company. Other variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Full sample Environmental Social Governance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reorganization -0.170*** -0.159*** -0.376*** -0.275** 0.018 -0.019 -0.044 0.039
Joint targeting 0.043 0.030 0.083 0.074 0.049 0.055 -0.165 -0.221
Contacted executives -0.05 -0.040 0.012 -0.126 -0.193** -0.085 -0.049 0.027
Number of contacts 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.012 -0.025** -0.02 0.014 0.012
Success streak 0.031** 0.021* 0.056** 0.045* 0.007 0.016 0.017 -0.017
Log total assets 0.021 -0.053** 0.021 -0.089** 0.048* -0.039 0.053 0.152**
Tobin’s Q -0.005 -0.019 -0.01 -0.074 -0.021 -0.019 -0.002 0.074
Sales growth -0.244*** -0.353*** -0.209* -0.304* -0.215* -0.314** -0.632*** -1.123***
BHR over 12 months -0.007 -0.048 -0.018 0.012 0.015 0.058 -0.259 -0.433**
ROA -0.16 -0.314 -0.569 0.145 0.846 -0.363 1.113 1.968*
Sales market share 1.134 1.906** -0.363 0.358 1.993* 2.796** -0.997 -0.91
Cash holding -0.225 -0.723** -0.959** -1.327*** 0.184 -0.568 0.473 0.304
Book leverage 0.054 -0.089 -0.176 -0.087 0.280** -0.097 0.363 -0.024
Dividend yield -0.53 0.295 -0.508 0.941 -0.54 -0.08 -1.995 -0.831
CapEX -0.213 0.322 -0.739 -0.483 0.984 2.173* -0.149 1.117
Amihud ILLIQ 0.007 0.389 0.119** -0.178 0.015 1.192** 0.331** -6.162
Analysts 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.004 0.007* -0.005 -0.018*
Toehold 0.007 -0.007 0.005 -0.019
Toehold increase -0.014 -0.1 0.047 0.104
Independent company 0.076 -0.007 0.099 -0.264





Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Geographic FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.08 0.18
N 784 577 336 255 332 227 116 95
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Table 5: Financial and ESG performance, and ownership after engagement by regions
This table reports the results of differences-in-differences estimations of the effect of engagement and success on financial and
ESG performance, as well as changes in ownership. The table reports the coefficient of the differencing term. The pre-treatment
period is defined one year before the start of an engagement sequence. In panel A, post-treatment is defined one year after
completion. In Panel B, post-treatment is defined two years after the first contact with the company. The period variable is 1
for post-treatment and 0 otherwise in both panels. In Panel A, the treatment is success versus no success, where the treatment
variable is 1 for success and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, the treatment is engaged versus matched companies, where the treatment
variable is 1 for engaged companies and 0 for the control sample. The matching sample is determined by Mahalanobis score
matching on industry, size, market-to-book, ESG and ROA. Leverage, size, tangibility, and industry and time fixed effects are
included in all specifications. Additionally, for Tobin’s Q ROA, CapEx and sales growth are also included. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.







E cases S cases G cases
Tobin’s Q -0.043 -0.008 -0.167 0.110 0.036 -0.124 0.266*
ROA -0.003 -0.003 0.006 0.002 0.008 -0.006 -0.019
Operating expenses 0.002 -0.006 0.014 -0.012 -0.008 0.008 -0.019
CapEX 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.001 -0.001
Sales growth 0.076*** 0.053* 0.093* 0.103* 0.097*** 0.032 0.229**
Sales market share 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000
Profit margin -0.018 -0.005 0.004 0.001 0.022 -0.039** -0.093
Asset turnover 0.010 -0.023 0.032 0.004 0.003 0.023 -0.043
Long-term holdings 0.304 -0.217 0.527 -1.708 2.098** -0.778 -4.161
Holding of engager 0.012 0.012 0.007 -0.028* -0.019 0.043** -0.010
ESG rating -0.654 1.605 10.635*** -0.231 1.844 -3.849 -0.953
Environmental score 0.129 2.780 13.917*** -0.491 1.552 -2.122 -3.103
Social score -0.491 1.557 4.394 -1.016 0.143 -2.374 -0.553
Governance score -1.855 -0.905 -2.513 0.900 1.157 -4.603* -2.629
Economic score -1.129 1.612 6.429 6.070 2.604 -4.368 0.265
Entrenchment index 0.026 0.037 0.003 0.031 0.002 0.040 0.016
Analysts -0.336 -0.147 -0.468 -1.567 -1.037 0.470 0.522







E cases S cases G cases
Tobin’s Q 0.013 0.039 -0.060 0.019 0.058 -0.062 0.093
ROA -0.000 -0.003 0.008 -0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.005
Operating expenses 0.003 0.004 0.010 0.000 -0.007 0.010 0.009
CapEX 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.007**
Sales growth -0.011 -0.018 0.031 -0.015 0.005 -0.008 -0.064
Sales market share -0.001*** -0.001 0.000 -0.004** -0.001 -0.002** -0.002
Profit margin 0.002 -0.004 0.026 -0.008 0.000 0.003 0.004
Asset turnover -0.016 -0.028** -0.014 -0.050** -0.004 -0.022 -0.030
Long-term holdings 0.520 0.380 -0.155 1.178 0.379 0.282 1.659*
Holding of engager 0.009 -0.004 -0.025 0.017 -0.004 0.006 0.048
ESG rating 0.522 0.957 9.284*** -4.134*** 0.677 0.385 -0.214
Asset4 environmental 0.281 1.376 10.425*** -4.901*** 0.135 0.119 0.720
Asset4 social -0.996 -0.982 4.167 -6.406*** -1.114 -0.858 -1.367
Asset4 governance -0.475 0.322 8.822*** -8.681*** 0.208 -1.113 -1.611
Asset4 economic 2.229 3.469* 21.680*** -9.294*** 2.852 2.299 -0.467
Entrenchment index 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.021 -0.001 0.012 0.018
Analysts 0.258 0.351 0.705 0.788 0.688* 0.108 -0.640
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Table 6: Buy-and-hold portfolio returns after completion
The table presents mean buy-and-hold returns for different event windows after the completion of engagements and various
subsamples by regions. For each subsample and event window, returns are calculated for the entire subsample, successful
and unsuccessful engagements, respectively. The table reports whether the mean is equal to zero and the difference between
successful and unsuccessful cases. For differences, one-sided statistics are reported. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
[0] [0,6] [0,12]
All Success No success All Success No success All Success No success
All cases
Mean 0.008** 0.012** 0.002 0.013 0.043*** -0.031** 0.018 0.044** -0.019
Obs 847 509 338 841 503 338 804 471 333
Diff. (t-stat) 1.338* 3.976*** 2.346***
Lowest ESG quartile
Mean 0.000 -0.002 0.003 -0.010 0.031 -0.043 0.010 0.023 0.000
Obs 176 78 98 176 78 98 170 74 96
Diff. (t-stat) -0.344 1.829** 0.412
Highest ESG quartile
Mean 0.010 0.009 0.016 0.022 0.033 -0.020 0.028 0.036 0.001
Obs 165 131 34 165 131 34 155 122 33
Diff. (t-stat) -0.462 1.121 0.484
Reorganization cases
Mean 0.011** 0.023*** 0.002 -0.004 0.036 -0.035** -0.010 0.011 -0.026
Obs 436 190 246 436 190 246 425 182 243
Diff. (t-stat) 2.191** 2.623*** 0.997
Environmental
Mean 0.010** 0.018*** 0.000 -0.016 0.032 -0.069*** -0.013 0.010 -0.036
Obs 358 190 168 353 185 168 330 167 163
Diff. (t-stat) 1.867** 3.806*** 1.240
Social
Mean 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.023* 0.040** -0.003 0.024 0.058** -0.025
Obs 367 223 144 366 222 144 352 208 144
Diff. (t-stat) -0.200 1.621* 2.074**
Governance
Mean 0.026** 0.029* 0.019 0.069** 0.072** 0.056 0.084* 0.074 0.123
Obs 122 96 26 122 96 26 122 96 26
Diff. (t-stat) 0.319 0.214 -0.474
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Table 7: Excess cumulative abnormal returns at case closure
This table reports cumulative abnormal return statistics for various event windows and subsamples in excess of a matched
sample. For each subsample, cumulative abnormal return statistics are reported for three event windows. The beginning of an
event window is defined as the month when an engagement case is completed, the end of the window is either the month, when
the engagement is completed or 6 or 12 months following completion. The estimation period is 36 months prior to engagement.
We use the Fama-French-Carhart model for the estimation of normal returns. Excess abnormal returns are calculated monthly
subtracting the returns of an equally weighted portfolio of matched companies. The matching sample is based on Mahalanobis
score matching on industry, size, market-to-book, ESG and ROA. For each event window and subsample combination we test
whether the mean cumulative abnormal return is 0 and the difference between successful and unsuccessful cases. For differences,
we calculate one-sided statistics where the alternative hypothesis is that successful engagements earn larger returns. *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
[0] [0,6] [0,12]
All Success No success All Success No success All Success No success
Full sample
Mean 0.005* 0.006 0.007 0.027*** 0.022* 0.036** 0.019 0.024 0.012
Obs 846 509 337 841 504 337 810 477 333
Difference 0.228 -0.737 0.400
Reorganization cases
Mean 0.006 0.011 0.002 0.044*** 0.035 0.051*** 0.022 0.046 0.005
Obs 435 190 245 435 190 245 424 182 242
Difference 0.912 -0.549 0.914
Lowest ESG quartile
Mean 0.006 0.025** -0.001 0.071*** 0.084** 0.060* 0.075** 0.113** 0.045
Obs 176 78 98 176 78 98 172 75 97
Difference 2.488*** 0.462 0.921
Highest ESG quartile
Mean 0.007 0.002 0.024 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.012
Obs 165 131 34 165 131 34 155 122 33
Difference -1.524 0.022 0.102
Environmental
Mean 0.009** 0.005 0.014 0.030** 0.008 0.055** -0.004 0.001 -0.010
Obs 358 190 168 354 186 168 335 171 164
Difference -0.887 -1.711 0.237
Social
Mean 0 0.007 -0.006 0.015 0.022 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.011
Obs 366 223 143 365 222 143 353 210 143
Difference 1.913** 0.654 0.330
Governance
Mean 0.011 0.004 0.041 0.057 0.047 0.094 0.144*** 0.109** 0.272***
Obs 122 96 26 122 96 26 122 96 26
Difference -1.098 -0.547 -1.425
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Appendix A: Engagement case examples
Environmental
Amid a changing regulatory environment, the activist hired a third party analyst firm
to evaluate the effects of new legislation on utility companies. The activist was specifically
interested in the risks associated with the CO2 emissions of energy companies. After assessing
the report, the activist reached out to company XXX on March 12, 2009. In a phone call,
the activist requested information on two specific issues related to CO2 emissions. First,
they were interested in the company’s strategy to reach statutory CO2 targets; and second,
the strategy regarding the acquisition and construction of new power plants. Following up
on the phone call, the activist paid a visit to XXX’s headquarters on April 24, 2009, meeting
an investor relations officer of the company. At this meeting, the activist elaborated on the
requests in more detail, stressing that their ultimate goal was that the company published
a sustainability report in response to these requests. The company representative assured
the activist that the company was aware of the changing regulatory environment and that
they were already working on a sustainability report to appease investors. Following the
publication of the report, the activist got back to the company in email on September 18,
2009 requesting more details on future prower plants. This was followed by a further email
on December 8. Finally, the company fulfilled all request of the activist publishing all
information online. After the activist verified the published information, the case was closed
as successful on February 25, 2010.
Social
The activist engaged financial institution YYY on March 10, 2006 to acquire more
information on human rights policies, following the publication of a BankTrack report in
January that indicated that YYY reported less information on the topic than its peers.
Specifically, the activist was concerned about the ethical standards of the bank corresponding
to investments in Russia and third world countries. The first meeting took place at the
activist’s offices with an investor relations officer of YYY. This meeting was followed by a
conference call on April 6, 2006 during which a YYY executive assured the activist that the
bank had nothing to hide. Furthermore, the executive explained that they do take human
rights issues into account for project financing and investments, although, as this was part
of their internal scoring processes, they did not want to disclose details to maintain their
competitive position. In response to the request for more transparency, the YYY executive
promised that they would publish a sustainability report for 2006. Following the publication
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of the report, engagers had a last meeting on October 26, 2006 with the investor relations
officer to go over the details of the report. As the report covered all concerns that the engager
previously raised, the case was closed as successful.
Governance
The activist engaged company ZZZ in 2007 concerning the size and composition of
the supervisory board of the company. The activist was concerned that the size of the board
was not large enough to fully oversee the company’s operations. A further concern was that
the CEO of the company was also the chairman of the supervisory board. The activist voiced
these concerns in collaboration with other investors at the AGM in mid-2007. ZZZ showed
willingness to revise its governance practices, however, the CEO remained the chairman of
the board. The activist revisited the case in 2008 and 2009 at the AGMs to no avail. Since
they could not reach their goal of improving ZZZs corporate governance, they closed the
cases as unsuccessful on May 12, 2009.
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Appendix B: Engagement topics – detailed
Environmental
Climate Change: Carbon Disclosure Project, Climate Change
Ecosystem Services: Alternative Energy, Biodiversity, Eco-Efficiency; Emissions, Effluents
and Waste; Nuclear Power, PVC and Phthalates, Tropical Hardwood, Water
Environmental Management: Environmental Management, Environmental Policy &
Performance, Environmental Reporting, Environmental Supply Chain Standards
Social
Human Rights and Ethics: Animal Testing, Anti-Corruption, Customer Satisfaction,
Ethics, Fur, Gambling, Human Rights, Military Production and Sales, Pornography and
Adult Entertainment Services, Social Supply Chain Standards, Stakeholder Management &
Reporting, Sustainability Reporting
Labor Standards: Attraction & Retention, Controversial Regimes, Forced and Compulsory
Labor, Human Capital, Labor Standards, Privacy & Freedom of Speech, Third World,
Training & Education, UN Global Compact
Public Health: Access to Medication, Alcohol, Genetic Engineering, Healthy Nutrition,
Integration in Products, Intensive Farming & Meat Sale, Product Safety, Tobacco
Governance
Corporate Governance: Board Practices, Governance Structure, Remuneration, Shareholder
Rights, Supervisory Board
Management and Reporting: Accountability & Transparency, Anti-Corruption, Corporate
Strategy, Risk & Crisis-Management, Stakeholder Management & Reporting
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Appendix C
Table C1: Variable definitions




Equally weighted Asset4 score: based on the Environmental, Social,




Environmental pillar score: a companys impact on living and
non-living natural systems, as well as complete ecosystems (0-100)
Social score
Social pillar score: a companys ability to generate trust and loyalty
with its workforce, customers and society (0-100)
Governance score
Governance pillar score: a companys systems and practices that ensure
that its executives and board act in the interest of (long-term)
shareholders (0-100)
Economic score
Economic pillar score: a companys capacity to generate sustainable
growth and returns through the efficient use of its assets and resources
(0-100)
Entrenchment index
Index of entrenchment measures (E-index): poison pill, golden
parachute, staggered board, bylaws and lock-ins (0-1)
Risk and performance
BHR Buy-and-hold stock return over 12 months
Datastream
Volatility Stock return volatility
Amihud ILLIQ Amihud illiquidity measure multiplied by $1 million
Asset turnover (Total sales)/(Total assets)
Profit margin (Net income)/(Total sales)
ROA (Net income)/(Total assets)
ROE (Net income)/(Book value of equity)
Sales growth Year-over-year sales growth
Sales market share Percentage of total industry sales
Market-to-book (Market value of equity)/(Book value of equity)
Tobin’s Q
(Market value of equity + Total book liabilities)/(Book value of equity
+ Total book liabilities)
Cash and expenses
Cash holding (Total cash)/(Total assets)
Datastream
CapEX (Capital Expenditures)/(Total assets)
Operating expenses (Operating expenses)/(Sales)
Size and capital structure
Log total assets Natural log of total assets
Datastream
Log sales Natural log of total sales
Log market equity Natural log of total market capitalization
Book leverage (Total book liabilities)/(Total book liabilities + Book value of equity)
Tangibility ratio (Plant, property and equipment)/(Total assets)
Continued on next page
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(Total dividends paid)/(Market value of equity + Market value of
preferred shares)
DatastreamDividend payout (Total dividends paid)/(Net income)
Company age Years since incorporation or IPO date
Analysts Mean number of analysts issuing earnings (EPS) forecasts annually I/B/E/S
Ownership
Holding of engager Portfolio holdings of engager (total)
Morningstar
Toehold
Indicator variable; 1 if the engager increases its holdings prior to
targeting
Toehold increase
Indicator variable; 1 if the engager increases its holdings over the
course of targeting
Average ownership Mean of ownership stakes
Orbis
Number of blockholders Number of owners with a +5% stake
Long-term investors Holdings by pension and mutual funds
Hedge funds and PE Holdings by edge funds, venture capitalists and private equity firms
Individuals and family Holdings by individuals and families
Independent company
Indicator if a company has no majority shareholder with a stake larger
than 25%
Miscellaneous
Contact number Number of contacts with the target company
Activist
Contact type The dominant channel of communication
Contacted executives
Role of contact person at target company; 1 for executive officers, 0
otherwise
Geographic FE Fixed effects for Asia, Europe, North America and Other regions
Industry FE Fixed effects for 17 Fama-French industries
Joint targeting Targeting in collaboration with other activists; 1 if jointly targeted, 0
otherwise
Length of sequence Time span of targeting in days
Previous engagements Number of previous cases with the same company
Success The originally defined goal is achieved; 1 for success, 0 otherwise
Success streak Number of previous successful cases with the same company
Receptiveness 1 if the target firm is initially willing to collaborate with the activist; 0
otherwise
Reorganization
1 for material request aimed at changing the company’s operations; 0
for an engagement aimed at enhancing transparency
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Appendix D
Table D1: Analysis of targeting by regions
This table reports the marginal effects obtained from probit regressions on the probability of targeting relative to a matched
sample. The first two columns report regression results for the whole sample of engagements (1-2), while the second, third and
fourth set of columns refer to North American (3-4), European (5-6) and Other domiciled (7-8) companies, respectively.The
dependent variable equals 1 if the company is targeted and 0 otherwise. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the
respective independent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The matching sample is determined by
Mahalanobis score matching on industry, size, market-to-book, ESG and ROA. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Full sample North America Europe Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log total assets -0.033*** -0.009 0.024 0.027 -0.082*** -0.058*** 0.033** 0.071***
Tobin’s Q -0.008 -0.001 0.016 0.010 -0.027* -0.009 0.019 -0.005
Sales growth 0 -0.045 -0.196** -0.153* 0.034 0.045 0.101 -0.035
BHR over 12 months 0.084*** 0.114*** -0.034 -0.036 0.088*** 0.143*** 0.092** 0.068
ROA 0.146 0.034 1.027** 0.928** -0.034 -0.245 0.092 -0.017
Sales market share 3.838*** 3.453*** 3.015*** 2.386** 4.318*** 3.953*** 1.228 0.099
Cash holding -0.005 0.050 0.285 0.194 -0.074 -0.080 -0.426* -0.349
Book leverage 0.018 0.036 0.184* 0.150 -0.039 -0.002 -0.087 -0.310**
Dividend yield 0.600 1.451** -0.345 0.261 0.901 1.725** 0.637 1.617*
CapEX 0.014 -0.020 -0.325 -0.390 -0.449 -0.468 0.842** 0.844*
Amihud ILLIQ 0 -0.354* -0.035 -136.388*** 0.001 -0.140 0 -0.906
Analysts 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.003 0 0.022*** 0.023*** -0.008*** -0.001
Previous engments -0.014 -0.019** -0.016 -0.026 -0.015 -0.017* -0.005 -0.020
Holding of engager 4.276 8.161** 5.428** 18.180
Independent company
yes=1
0.032 0.068 0.037 0.050
Entrenchment index -0.023 0.158* -0.096 -0.297***
ESG score -0.103* 0.025 -0.083 -0.079
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Geographic FE yes yes no no no no no no
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.25 0.22 0.28 0.06 0.24
N 3,174 2,478 776 641 1,722 1,501 676 319
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Table D2: Analysis of success by regions
This table reports the marginal effects obtained from linear probability regressions on the probability of success. The dependent
variable equals 1 if the engagement is successful and 0 otherwise. The first two columns report regression results for the whole
sample of engagements (1-2), while the second, third and fourth set of columns refer to North American (3-4), European (5-6)
and Other domiciled (7-8) companies, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The dummy ”Reorganization”
takes the value 1 for reorganization cases and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable “Collaboration” equals one for cases where
the engager contacts the company with other activists. The variable “Contacted executives” is 1 if executive management
is contacted and 0 otherwise. “Number of activities” and “Success streak” refer to the number of contacts per case and the
number of previous successful cases with the company. Other variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Full sample North America Europe Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reorganization -0.170*** -0.159*** -0.284* -0.231 -0.162*** -0.138** 0.222 -0.067
Joint targeting 0.043 0.030 0.275** 0.218 -0.023 -0.025 -0.107 -0.245
Contacted executives -0.05 -0.040 -0.174 -0.216 0.053 0.038 -0.235* 0.292
Number of activities 0.005 0.005 -0.001 -0.003 0.012* 0.011 0.017 0.074
Success streak 0.031** 0.021* 0.080 0.021 0.017 0.013 0.092 0.117
Log total assets 0.021 -0.053** -0.029 -0.120*** 0.019 -0.012 0.085*** 0.047
Tobin’s Q -0.005 -0.019 0.026 -0.001 -0.011 -0.013 -0.019 -0.215**
Sales growth -0.244*** -0.353*** -0.083 0.016 -0.410*** -0.442*** 0.033 0.255
BHR over 12 months -0.007 -0.048 0.187* 0.236** -0.124* -0.219*** 0.008 -0.135
ROA -0.16 -0.314 -0.776 -1.713* 0.307 0.321 1.157 -1.175
Sales market share 1.134 1.906** 2.026 1.954 0.772 0.65 -0.309 -4.341
Cash holding -0.225 -0.723** -0.676 -1.010** -0.349 -0.731* 0.436 1.889
Book leverage 0.054 -0.089 -0.283 -0.455** 0.13 0.065 0.213 -0.255
Dividend yield -0.53 0.295 0.576 4.387** -1.177 -1.317 -1.118 -0.515
CapEX -0.213 0.322 1.236 2.217** -0.804 -0.645 0.666 0.523
Amihud ILLIQ 0.007 0.389 0.093*** -152.027*** 0.067* 0.258 -0.021 0.541
Analysts 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.028
Initial holding jump 0.007 0.008 -0.003 0.084
Holding increase -0.014 -0.033 0.045 0.148
Independent company 0.076 0.087 0.004 -0.076
Entrenchment index 0.020 -0.044 0.152 -0.163
ESG rating 0.448*** 0.586** 0.237 1.031*
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Geographic FE yes yes no no no no no no
Industry FE yes yes no no no no no no
Adjusted R2 0.2 0.22 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.11
N 784 577 192 166 433 360 159 51
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